Learn how the Galaxy Note 7 shows that a second supplier's part must pass the same safety tests as the first.
In hardware development, when a part from one supplier fails, teams often switch to a second supplier for the same part. It seems like a quick fix because both parts are built to the same specification.
The Samsung Galaxy Note 7 case shows why the second supplier's part must pass the same safety tests before it goes into the product. When the Note 7's batteries caught fire, Samsung replaced the phones with ones using batteries from its second supplier. Then the replacements caught fire as well.
The Note 7 went on sale on August 19, 2016. Samsung announced a global recall on September 2 and stopped production on October 11, 53 days after launch.
In this article, we take a closer look at the origins of the Note 7 battery failures and the transferable lessons engineers can apply to their projects.
The Galaxy Note 7 was Samsung's large-screen flagship phone. Samsung sold about 3.06 million units, each using lithium-ion pouch cells from two established suppliers: Samsung SDI for the original units and ATL for the replacements.
Both batteries failed due to an internal short between the positive and negative electrodes, triggering thermal runaway. Samsung's infographic identifies the main cause in battery A as a deflected negative electrode in the upper-right corner, with the electrode tip in the curve rather than the flat area. In battery B, high welding burrs on the positive electrode penetrated the insulation tape and separator, and some cells had no insulation tape at all.
One outside analysis adds a packaging perspective. An Instrumental teardown of one unit measured a 5.2 mm battery in a 5.2 mm pocket. In other words, the pocket had zero clearance, which contradicts a rule of thumb that pockets need approximately 10% of the battery's thickness. Samsung's official finding doesn't include this.
The illustration shows that a replacement part deserves the same safety tests as the original before it goes into the product.
Every decision likely seemed reasonable at the time. SDI and ATL were established suppliers. The first failures pointed to one supplier, so moving production to the other was a logical fix, and the recall was swift.
Viewed through a requirements engineering lens, the replacement cells came from a different production line, but they reached the field without verification strong enough to catch a different defect. Samsung's mobile chief put it plainly that "the overall responsibility falls to us for failing to verify its safety and quality." Contributing factors included volume and time pressure on the supplier switch, and, in one outside reading, a tight design margin.
Most hardware teams don't ship millions of phones in a few weeks, but they second-source parts all the time. A connector swapped for a pin-compatible one, a regulator changed during a shortage, or a battery pack from a new vendor: each looks like the same part on the BOM.
Best practice: Link every safety requirement to its test evidence for each approved supplier.
A requirement such as "no internal short under rated swell" is verified only for the samples you tested. Record which supplier and which revision each test covered. When you add a second source, the requirement appears unverified for that source until it has its own evidence. The Note 7 replacement cells came from a different production line, and a different defect got through.
Best practice: Treat every part or supplier change as a new design that reopens its linked verification.
A change request should list the requirements the part affects and reset their status. That turns "same datasheet" into a list of tests to rerun. After the recall, Samsung added an eight-point battery safety check, including X-ray, disassembly, and accelerated usage tests. That's the kind of verification that catches a defect the first fix missed.
Best practice: Write mechanical clearance as a requirement with a number, and verify it on measured parts.
A requirement stating "the battery cell shall fit the pocket" isn't testable. Instead, a requirement specifying a clearance of "at least 10% of the cell's thickness" is both clear and testable. Measure production samples, not just CAD nominals, and record the value against the requirement.
The same gap appears on any board with a second-source part. Every replacement part is a new design that must be reverified. Ask your team:
A connected requirements workflow links each requirement to its design data and test evidence, so a part change shows which requirements must be reverified.
With Requirements Portal, teams keep requirements, their verification status, and their links to designs and V&V activities in one shared place. When a team adds a second supplier or changes a component, the links show which requirements the change affects, so the owner knows which tests to rerun.
If you want more lessons from real hardware cases, these articles cover other requirements management failures and what you can learn from them:
Internal short circuits in the lithium-ion battery cells led to thermal runaway. Samsung identified two defects: a deflected negative electrode in the original SDI cells and high welding burrs and missing insulation tape in the replacement ATL cells.
The replacement units used cells from a second supplier, and those cells had a different defect. The switch addressed the first defect, but the new cells weren't sufficiently verified to catch the second.
Samsung estimated the operating profit impact at about $5.3 billion. It sold about 3.06 million units and recovered more than 96% of them by January 2017.